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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T TBILISI 000146

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [MOPS](#) [KG](#) [KZ](#) [TI](#) [TX](#) [UZ](#) [GG](#)  
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON  
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK, C-RE9-02185

REF: A. 09 STATE 123007  
[1](#)B. 09 TBILISI 2239

Classified By: DCM Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S/NF) In response to ref A the following is further information regarding the Northern Distribution Network in Georgia.

[1](#)A. (C) PLEASE DESCRIBE THE HOST COUNTRY LEADER VIEWS ON THE US MILITARY LOCAL PURCHASE PLAN'S PROGRESS AND ANY BENEFIT TO THE HOST COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. HOW SATISFIED ARE HOST COUNTRIES WITH THIS PROGRAM?

There is no U.S. Military local purchase plan in Georgia. DLA has reviewed outlets to purchase goods in Georgia and Georgian companies are interested in pursuing opportunities to sell goods to the U.S. military.

[1](#)B. (C) PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY INSTANCES OF HOST COUNTRY GRAFT AND CORRUPTION IN THE US LOCAL PURCHASE PLAN, INCLUDING ANY INDICATIONS THAT HOST COUNTRY SENIOR LEADERSHIP IS INVOLVED. WHO IN THE HOST COUNTRY -- LEADERS, MINISTRIES, CLANS -- BENEFITS THE MOST?

There are no known instances of host country graft, as there is no purchase plan.

[1](#)C. (C) HOW DO HOST COUNTRIES LEADERS VIEW EXPANDING THE NDN TO INCLUDE TRANSITING MILITARY SUPPLIES CONSIDERED "LETHAL"?

The GOG is eager to expand their transport of military supplies and has put no restrictions on cargo.

[1](#)D. (C) PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY EXTERNAL POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM RUSSIA, CHINA, ETC., TO ALTER OR TERMINATE PARTICIPATION IN THE NDN.

Given the tense relations with Russia and Russia's own supply transit role, the Russians would be pleased for Georgia to cease participating in the Northern Distribution Network. However, Post is unaware of Russian pressure on Georgia on this particular issue. Russia and Georgia broke diplomatic relations after the August 2008 war.

[1](#)E. (C) WHAT PLANS DO HOST COUNTRIES HAVE IN PLACE FOR RESPONDING TO ATTACKS AGAINST COALITION SUPPLY LINES? HOW WOULD TERRORIST ATTACKS OR OTHER SABOTAGE INCIDENTS AGAINST SUPPLY LINES INFLUENCE THE HOST COUNTRY'S RESOLVE TO CONTINUE PARTICIPATING IN THE NDN?

There are no specific plans in place to repair supply lines, but the GOG would act quickly to repair any kind of damaged infrastructure (for example, rail lines) in the case of damage. They have demonstrated their willingness and ability to do this as recently as the war in August of 2008, and we would expect the same in case of a terrorist attack.

[1](#)F. (C) WHAT ARE THE MOST VULNERABLE POINTS -- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, OR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE -- IN THE HOST

COUNTRY THAT, IF CHALLENGED, WOULD AFFECT ITS WILLINGNESS TO  
CONTINUE NDN COOPERATION WITH THE US?

None of the aforementioned potential vulnerabilities affect Georgia's willingness to participate in the Network. Georgia is eager to demonstrate its continued willingness to contribute to the Allied effort in Afghanistan, including by committing a battalion (approximately 750) of troops to serve alongside the U.S. Marines in Afghanistan with no caveats (ref B), so we would not expect any of the factors listed to deter Georgia from participating.

BASS